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CHILD ABUSE REPORTING IN NEW YORK STATE:
THE DILEMMA OF THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL
Hon. David J. Agatstein I/
A young mother, who may be suffering from post-partem
psychosis, consults a psychotherapist. She relates the apparently
obsessional and possibly delusional belief that a neighbor, for
whom she sometimes babysits, once tortured his son by placing
the child's hand in boiling water.
How does the therapist's duty of confidentiality apply
to this case? What is the therapist's legal exposure if either
child (the mother's or the neighbor's) is thereafter seriously
harmed? These and related questions are considered in the
following article.
Introduction
Encouraged by federal grant legislation, all states
have enacted laws aimed at curbing the abuse, maltreatment and
sexual exploitation of children. The state laws place a special
burden upon members of the helping professions: most laws
require specified professionals to report abuse or neglect to a
central register maintained by a state agency.
New York's reporting statute (Social Services Law
Section 413) was adopted in 1973. From that date until the
present it has required certain professionals, including physi-
cians, nurses and social workers, to issue a report "when they
have reasonable cause to suspect that a child coming before them
in their professional or official capacity is an abused or
maltreated child." Psychologists were added to the list of
mandated reporters in 1979.
1/ Editor-in-Chief, Journal of the National Association of
Administrative Law Judges. This excerpt is taken from an
article appearing in the Fall 1989 issue of the New York Law
School Law Review and is reprinted here by permission.
Footnotes have been omitted.
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In 1984 and 1985 New York's reporting statute was
significantly expanded. Affected professionals must now report,
not only when they personally observe the victimized child, but
when "the parent, guardian, custodian or other person legally
responsible for the child comes before them in their professional
capacity and states from personal knowledge facts, conditions or
circumstances which, if correct, would render the child" abused
or maltreated. Failure to report, as required by the statute,
is a misdemeanor, and exposes the practitioner to charges of
professional misconduct and civil liability for damages.
However well-intentioned the expanded reporting
requirement may be, it poses a serious ethical, practical and
legal dilemma for mental health professionals. The dilemma
arises from the unique relationship established between the
practitioner and the patient as a means of improving the patient's
condition. The relationship is described by Gutheil and Appelbaum
under the heading "Trust as the Basis of the Therapeutic Alliance."
The authors state:
The alliance in therapy is based on a collaboration
between the therapist and the nonpathologic (or "healthy")
aspects of the patient's personality. To obtain this
collaborative stance, the therapist attempts to "see the
world through the patient's eyes," striving for a state of
empathic rapport. At the same time, in tension with this
collaborative approach, the therapist must inevitably work
in opposition to the pathologic (or "sick") aspects of the
patient's psyche (e.g., a tendency toward harshly punitive
self-appraisal), in effect acting as an advocate for the
healthy side of the patient. The foregoing requires from
the patient an openness of self-disclosure and comfort with
candor, in respect to which the physician owes the protection
of confidentiality.
As noted in the New York Law School Law Review article
from which this excerpt is taken, breach of the duty of confi-
dentiality may have seriously adverse consequences for the
patient's health. A therapist's breach of confidence may be a
tort, professional misconduct, and even, in some cases,, a crime.
The reporting requirement of Section 413 potentially
conflicts with the duty of confidentiality. Although the
statute purports to shield good faith reporting from civil and
criminal liability, and sets up a presumption of good faith in
favor of those who file a report without "wilful misconduct or
gross negligence," "in the discharge of their duties and within
the scope of their employment," the mental health professions 123
may still encounter situations which appear to implicate contra-
dictory principles of good professional practice and lawful
behavior. Accordingly, it is not surprising that some practi-
tioners feel they are "damned if they do, and damned if they
don't."
The Thesis
One need only examine the photographs in Helfer and
Kempe's book, The Battered Child, or read the various accounts
of children who have been mutilated, starved, tortured and
killed, to understand the impetus behind mandatory reporting
laws. These laws exist because child victims are often unable
to protect themselves or to denounce their abusers. However,
while the statute's praiseworthy goal is the prevention of child
abuse, this article will suggest that Section 413, in its
present form, is overbroad and misdirected, thereby impinging
upon other important societal goals, legal rights, and humane
values, and that, in the final analysis, the Section's expansive
reporting requirement is counterproductive.
The Need for Confidentiality in
Psychotherapy: Therapeutic Arauments
Sigmund Freud expressed the need for confidentiality
in absolute terms. "The whole enterprise becomes lost," he
wrote, "if a single concession is made to secrecy." Hippocrates
might not have disagreed. His famous oath contains the pledge:
"Whatever, in connection with my profession, or not in connection
with it, I may see or hear in the lives of men which ought not
to be spoken abroad, I will not divulge as reckoning that all
should be kept secret."
The basic therapeutic rationale for requiring confi-
dentiality in psychotherapy is succinctly explained by Shuman
and Weiner:
Although there are many types of psychotherapy, the model
upon which privilege arguments primarily rest is psycho-
analysis, originated by Sigmund Freud.
Based on his experience in treating emotional disorders,
Freud theorized that certain types of emotional problems
result from the rekindling of repressed emotional conflicts
from early childhood. Those conflicts are repressed into
the unconscious portions of the mind because they are
unacceptable to the conscious self. The treatment brings
these conflicts to consciousness so that the patient can
more adequately deal with or resolve them. Free association
is the technique by which the psychoanalyst and patient
gain access to the patient's unconscious mind. Hence,
Freud's fundamental rule for a patient in psychoanalysis,
stated above, is that the patient must disclose to the
therapist all (emph. in orig.) of his thoughts or feelings.
Freud concluded that withholding material of any sort from
the therapist served the purpose of resistance, an automatic
attempt by the patient's mind to block the emergence of
material from the unconscious. The work of psychoanalysis
is removing the patient's resistance to discovery of what
has been repressed. Unless the patient is assured that the
therapist has no authority over him--for example, through
disclosure of their communications in court--the built-in
resistance to full disclosure cannot be overcome. The
patient must trust the therapist; this can occur only if
the patient alone holds the key to disclosure of matters
revealed in therapy.
The same rationale applies, with only slightly diminished force,
to other forms of psychotherapy.
Generally accepted medical theory, and repeated
clinical observations, tend to show that a therapist's breach of
silence may have deleterious effects upon a patient. These
observations have been confirmed, tentatively, in a number of
empirical studies. Moreover, there is evidence developed in
other, actionable cases of trust betrayal between therapist and
patient. The evidence available to present-day psychotherapists
thus suggests the following reasons for upholding the principle
of confidentiality in psychotherapy.
The first reason for confidentiality relates to the
availability of treatment. It has been observed that abusive
parents may withhold medical treatment from battered children
because the parents are ashamed, or because they fear the legal
consequences of disclosure. In the case of psychotherapy,
abusive parents may not only withhold treatment from the child,
but may themselves avoid obtaining the treatment they need to
overcome their abusive behavior. Psychotherapists have expressed
the opinion that abusive parents may be emotionally disturbed,
or character disordered, and would benefit from psychotherapy.
Accordingly, in the case of psychotherapists, mandatory reporting
is especially self-defeating.
The next reason relates to diagnosis. In almost every
instance, the information necessary to make such diagnosis must
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come from the patient. As Coleman has observed, a proper
psychotherapeautic diagnosis requires full disclosure, in a safe
environment, of the patient's innermost feelings, fantasies,
terrors and shame. A patient who does not expect confidentiality
from the therapist may not make the necessary disclosures. If,
in consequence, the patient's diagnosis is not accurate, he or
she may not be correctly treated. The therapist will have
failed in the duty to advance the patient's cure. Here again,
if the untreated illness is related to the alleged child abuse,
the absence of confidentiality in connection with the diagnosis
may defeat the very purpose of the reporting laws.
Reduced to its essence, the third reason for confiden-
tiality is that the patient, having learned of the therapist's
act of reporting, may simply withdraw from treatment. The
patient may discontinue treatment entirely or (as in the case of
an involuntarily committed patient) merely withhold, deliberately
or subconsciously, that high degree of frank disclosure necessary
for effective psychotherapy. In either case, the patient's
recovery may be impeded or reversed.
Next, disclosure by the therapist may be devastating
to those patients whose mental illness affects their ability to
establish relationships of trust. Coleman notes that a patho-
logical inability to trust is a common symptom among incest
offenders. Janssen expressed the opinion that, for some patients,
development of a trusting relationship is the essence of treatment
itself. In an observation particularly relevant to the problem
under discussion, a number of therapists have hypothesized that
the experience of growing up within an abusive family inhibits
the formation of basic trust, which is necessary to relate to
others outside of the family.
Even actual knowledge of mandatory reporting laws, or
prior warning by the therapist, may be insufficient to overcome
the decompensation which may result from reporting in (for
example) a patient with borderline personality disorder. If the
patient is suicidal, or has other violent tendencies, the risks
attendant upon a breach of confidence are especially great.
Writing about incest as a form of reportable abuse,
Coleman, citing Meiselman, states:
Psychosis would also seem to be a factor because of
the breakdown in ego controls that accompany a psychotic
condition. Nevertheless, despite its reasonableness,
the presumption that many incestuous fathers must have
been psychotic when the incest began has not been
confirmed. However, it is interesting to note that a
father often becomes psychotic after the offense has
been exposed, sometimes while serving his prison
sentence. . . . This is particularly important in the
context of the psychiatrist's duty to report. It
would seem extremely unrealistic to expect a psychia-
trist to report his or her patient if the psychiatrist
believes the report and possible subsequent incarcera-
tion would cause a psychotic break.
Other diagnostic categories may be imagined in which the thera-
pist's breach of trust might adversely affect the patient's
recovery.
The fifth reason is that, where the patient is the
suspected abuser, and is subject to criminal prosecution,
reporting contravenes the therapist's duty to promote healing.
This duty has been recognized by the American Psychological
Association, the American Medical Association, and the American
Psychiatric Association.
Finally, Dubey has argued that a therapist should not
disclose a patient's confidences, even with the patient's
consent, if the information is to be used in a manner which will
have legal consequences for the patient. Observing that "what
may be in a person's best interests, i.e., maintenance of
dramatic symptoms in order to present a sound case for disability
or liability, may be directly contrary to his therapeutic
interests, i.e., relinquishing of symptoms," Dubey writes:
• . . the psychiatrist's problem with the waiver of
privilege is that it can force the therapist to
cooperate with the patient's strategies to acquire
secondary gain. Halleuk (cit. om.) discussed at
length the problems encountered in psychiatric excuse
giving.
Quoting Hollender, Dubey states:
If the psychiatrist speaks in court in the patient's
behalf, he becomes an ally against an outside adversary;
if he speaks against his patient, he becomes an enemy.
In either case he abrogates his therapeutic role and
takes another, and potentially incompatible role.
Thus writes Dubey:
In order to discourage secondary gain, confidentiality
is necessary, so that disclosures will have no power
or influence of any kind, harmful or helpful, over the
patient's extra-therapeutic life.
It follows from Dubey's argument that confidentiality, which is
"needed to protect the practice of psychotherapy" cannot be
waived, even before a therapeutic relationship is established:
When the therapist is asked, "Doctor, is what I tell
you confidential?" he must be able to answer "What you
tell me I will keep confidential, even if you decide
that you don't want me to."
Upon the basis of the foregoing, the therapeutic
argument may conclude with the observation that something of
great value, if not the "whole enterprise" may be lost if the
therapist divulges that "which ought not to be spoken abroad."
The Social Work Arauments
As used in this article, "social work arguments" are
those which take into consideration not only the immediate
interests of the patient and the child, but the interests of
other family members and society as a whole. While not every
professional social worker would agree with every argument
advanced in this article, nor with the ultimate conclusion, the
arguments reflect, or attempt to reflect, serious concerns of
the profession. In social work, as in law, there is often truth
on both sides of an issue.
Thus, the first social work argument is that, for
largely unavoidable reasons, the act of reporting child abuse
often leads nowhere. This is illustrated by the 1983 Family
Court opinion, Matter of Marcario.
Marcario arose prior to the 1984 amendments to Social
Services Law Section 413. It involved the application of a
Child Protective Service case worker for a search warrant to
determine if an abused or neglected child was present in the
family home. Some three months earlier the case worker had
received a telephone call from a person identifying herself as a
"Mrs. Ocario" (sic) who stated that her angry husband, while
under the influence of alcohol, on an occasion not further
identified, punched his six-year-old son in the stomach several
times and threw a coffee table at him. On further investigation,
both Mr. & Mrs. Marcario denied the alleged abuse, and Mrs. Mar-
cario denied that it was she who made the initial call to the
CPS case worker.
The Family Court declined to issue a search warrant,
holding that the Aguilar test, pertaining to the adequacy of the
informant's knowledge, had not been met. In so doing, the Court
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noted, among other things, that the child himself had not come
before the Protective Service worker, as then required by Social
Services Law Section 413. Of course, Section 413 pertained to
mandatory reporting, not to the granting of a search warrant.
The Court's point was that the case worker in Marcario did not
have any information about the alleged abuse derived from the
child himself.
The 1984 and 1985 amendments to Section 413 do not
resolve this problem, while a therapist who provides all of the
resolve this problem. While a therapist who provides all of the
information required by Section 415 might, in some cases,
enhance the ability of CPS to secure judicial process in aid of
its investigation, where the therapist does not examine the
child, her report to a case worker who has not examined the
child may be insufficient, under Aguilar, to support the applica-
tion for a search warrant. (While the Acuilar test is no longer
applied by the Federal courts, it is still the law in New York.)
Moreover, it is unlikely that a psychotherapy patient will
provide the therapist with all of the specific details required
by Section 415, unless the patient is encouraged by the therapist
to do so. This involves the therapist in the further ethical
dilemma of determining the extent to which the patient should be
questioned for the purpose of filing a child abuse report. If
the patient is the suspected abuser, and is subject to criminal
prosecution, it raises the question of whether and under what
circumstances the therapist becomes a custodial agent of the
government who must provide the patient with Miranda warnings.
The question as to whether the therapist, consistently with his
professional duty to the patient, should participate at all in a
process that might lead to his patient's incarceration is also
implicated. In any event, for the purpose of the first social
work argument, it may be sufficient to note that the additional
cases now subject to mandatory reporting by reason of the 1984
and 1985 amendments to the statute (i.e., cases in which the
therapist did not personally examine the child) are precisely
those cases least likely to result in successful judicial
intervention.
To summarize and continue, the first social work
argument is this: since case workers are frequently unable to
secure the evidence necessary to initiate child protective
proceedings, the filing of a child abuse report is often a
futile act.
Secondly, even if case workers possess sufficient
prima facia evidence, successful prosecution, particularly in
criminal cases, is far from assured: child witnesses and other
family members may be reluctant to testify, or may recant their
allegations, or the accused may offer credible evidence in
rebuttal.
Next, the investigation of a child abuse report may do
more harm than good. The investigation intrudes government
agents (CPS case workers) into intimate family matters; it
disrupts family unity; and it involves a breach of family
privacy which, at best, is unsettling to the child, the suspected
adult, and other family members. Where, as in the cases under
discussion, one member of the household is already speaking to a
psychotherapist, this argument holds that the therapist, rather
than a government case worker, may be in the better position to
address the underlying problem.
If the investigation is harmful, litigation is worse.
The feelings engendered by court proceedings, especially criminal
proceedings, are totally inconsistent with family stability.
One frequently encountered goal of psychotherapy--a
goal expressly recognized in New York's Consolidated Services
Plan--is preservation and unification of the family unit. In
cases of incest, the indicated course of treatment may include
family counseling involving all members of the household.
Coleman has suggested that the efficacy of such treatment may be
undermined or lost by reporting, and the investigation and legal
proceedings which may then ensue. Certainly, the problem of
confidentiality, which is difficult enough in the context of
family counseling, is compounded by the requirement of reporting
confidences to an outside agency.
The incarceration of an abusive parent is destructive
of family stability, in that it removes a member who, to one
extent or another, may support the family emotionally or finan-
cially. Removal of the child to a foster home, which may result
from criminal or protective proceedings, is also highly inimical
to family cohesiveness. Moreover, while the judgment in
successful child protective proceedings frequently includes
provision for mandatory therapy of the abuser, the social work
argument suggests that this result may be achieved more effec-
tively, at an earlier date, and at less cost to the state,
through skillful intervention by the family's own therapist.
Indeed, the process leading to compulsory treatment is
inherently self-defeating: the basic trust necessary for
effective psychotherapy cannot be mandated.
f By discouraging frank disclosure, the present system
tends to perpetuate abusive parenting. Children learn inappro-
Friate patterns of behavior from unrehabilitated family members.
In addition, the present statute encourages profes-
sionals to overreport, thereby diluting the ability of CPS to
respond aggressively to genuine emergencies. The serious
consequences of an abuse investigation are brought to bear in
many situations where no abuse has occurred.
Finally, beyond all this, government intervention may
breed resentment, hostility, and retaliation by the alleged
abuser. The incidence of family violence may actually increase.
For these reasons, the social work argument concludes,
the present system of mandatory reporting is not in the best
interests of the child, the patient, the family or the community.
At best, the benefits of the system are outweighed by its
emotional and social costs. At worst, the effects of the law
are in direct opposition to the aims of the social work profession
and the goals of the statute itself.
Some Legal Arguments
Stone remarks that lawyers assume the need for confi-
dentiality in their own profession while demanding justification
for its recognition in psychotherapy. Whether or not this is
entirely true, there are legal arguments for confidentiality in
therapy which cannot be swept away by mandatory reporting laws.
Four such arguments are here presented.
Mandatory Reporting May Violate the Therapist's
Contractual Obliqation and Ethical Duty to Use Her Best
Professional Judgment on Behalf of Her Patients
In Doe v. Roe, Justice Stecher said:
[A] physician, who enters into an agreement with a
patient to provide medical attention, impliedly
covenants to keep in confidence all disclosures made
by the patient concerning the patient's physical or
mental condition as well as all matters discovered by
the physician in the course of examination or treatment.
This is particularly and necessarily true of the
psychiatric relationship . ...
It may be argued, however, that statutory reporting
equirements are also implied in every contract for therapeutic
ervices; that everyone is presumed to know the law; and that,
n any event, a therapist may expressly include the duty to
eport in the contract for professional services by raising the
1.31
issue at an appropriate time. These arguments do not withstand
analysis.
First, it is apparent that the patient may lack the
mental capacity to execute a legally binding contract, or to
understand the reporting requirements of the law, when he is
first presented, voluntarily or otherwise, for psychiatric
examination and treatment. Although possessing that minimal
level of competence necessary for voluntary admission to treat-
ment, he may be in a state of turmoil, and suffering from a
condition which, in the therapist's professional judgment, would
be exacerbated by warnings about disclosure; the patient may
even be suicidal. To help such patient, the therapist might
find it necessary to enter an immediate relationship of trust
and confidence with the patient; to establish the therapeutic
alliance; and to shield the patient, at least for a time, from
certain aspects of unpleasant reality. In short, it may be
therapeutically necessary for the therapist and patient to enter
into an agreement, express or implied, that the therapist will
not divulge any of the patient's confidences--certainly not
those which might result in the patient's incarceration. At the
very least, the therapist might find it therapeutically inadvis-
able to force an agreement that disclosure will be made "immedi-
ately," as required by Social Services Law Section 413. In
these circumstances, an "implied-in-law" agreement to disclose
is a fiction, and is at war with the therapist's duty and
agreement to help the patient.
Even in less acute circumstances, where the patient
understands the disclosure requirement, the therapist may
determine that immediate reporting is contraindicated. Thus, in
some circumstances, the therapist may find that the patient's
condition will be best treated by assisting the patient to
recognize and address an unhealthy situation (for example,
inappropriate sexual contact between the patient's spouse and
child); if confrontation does not resolve the problem, the
therapist may, perhaps, encourage the patient to report the
maltreatment himself. This conduct by the therapist would
violate the statute (which requires the therapist, not the
patient, to report, and to do so at once), while compliance with
the statute would violate the therapist's duty to exercise her
professional judgment in the patient's behalf.
Finally, among those therapist's who follow Dubey, no
agreement for disclosure made with any patient could be reconciled
with the therapist's obligation to advance the patient's thera-
peutic interests. It follows that mandatory reporting is
irreducibly opposed to the principle of patient care and inde-
pendence of the therapist's professional judgment.32
Mandatory Reporting is Inconsistent
With the Statutory Grant of Testimonial Privilece
Testimonial privilege (or, more simply, "privilege")
is a term of art used in the law of evidence. Unlike the rules
of confidentiality (which generally require professionals to
keep silent at all times outside of the courthouse, and to raise
the issue of confidence when questioned before the court, the
rules of privilege relate specifically to the admission or
exclusion of evidence from legal proceedings, including trials
and depositions.
Questions of privilege relevant to the present topic
arise most frequently when a therapist is called to testify
about facts (the allegedly privileged communications) acquired
in confidence from a patient, or to produce records of treatment.
With respect to such evidence, the following general rules
apply:
A privilege, like a confidence, may exist without a
contract, and even without the patient's consent--for example,
in the case of involuntary commitment. The patient, and not the
therapist, owns the privilege: if the patient waives the
privilege, the therapist may not withhold evidence on these
grounds. If the patient is not a party to the proceeding, and
has not waived the privilege, the therapist must invoke the
privilege on the patient's behalf, by raising the appropriate
objection. Questions of privilege are decided by the court.
New York, which pioneered the physician-patient
privilege in 1828, has expanded its list of privileges to
include psychologists and Social Workers. These privileges are
not identical.
The critical point is that all of the cited privileges,
to one degree or another, are in potential conflict with the
child abuse reporting law, which applies to children under
eighteen years of age (not sixteen, the maximum age of required
disclosure under the physician-patient privilege statute), and
applies whether or not the child is the patient or client. With
respect to the psychologist-patient privilege, which is equated
with the attorney-client privilege, it will be recalled that
psychologists are required to report child abuse; attorneys,
except for prosecuting attorneys, are not. Accordingly, situa-
tions may arise in which the professional's report of suspected
child abuse may trigger a legal proceeding, which will ultimately
fail for want of the professional's crucial, but privileged 133
testimony. The unhappy consequences of this imbroglio have
already been noted.
Mandatory Reporting is Irreconcilable with
Patients' Legitimate Interest in Privacy
This argument suggests that a right of confidentiality
is implicit in the United States Constitution, and is reflected
in statutory provisions which uphold the autonomy, dignity and
privacy of the individual: confidentiality is, for example,
complementary to the right of informed consent.
Cases in California, Pennsylvania, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have referred to a
constitutional basis for a psychotherapist-patient privilege.
In an e'ctended analysis relying upon the substantive due process
constructs of Griswold v. Connecticut Rnd Roe v. Wade (which was
subsequently overruled by the Supreme Court), and other lines of
reasoning, Smith has advanced the argument for further recognition
of this constitutional right. While a constitutional basis for
psychotherapeutic confidentiality has not been identified by any
New York court, the present argument holds that appropriate
recognition of fundamental values, as expressed in the Constitu-
tion, militates in favor of modifying the New York reporting
law, by assigning greater importance to the privacy interests of
psychotherapeutic patients.
Mandatory Reportina Involves the Therapist in a
Personal Conflict of Interest and the Prospect
of Serious Economic Harm
It is a cardinal rule of good professional practice
that the needs of the patient, rather than those of the therapist,
should determine the course of treatment. This principle cannot
withstand the distorting influence of the reporting law.
In most instances, mandatory and voluntary child abuse
reporters are immune from tort liability. On the other hand,
the statute expressly creates a civil cause of action against
therapists who fail to report when required to do so. The
pressure thus placed upon a therapist to report all instances of
suspected child abuse, in order to avoid personal liability, may
skew his professional judgment, to the detriment of his patients.
The therapist must weigh his own legal interests against the
therapeutic needs of his patients. The introduction of the
therapist's own interest as a factor in the therapeutic equation
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is contrary to the ethical ideals which distinguish a learned
and helping profession from a mere trade or business.
That failure to report as required by the statute may
result in civil liability (and an award of substantial damages)
is no longer open to doubt. The leading precedent is the
California case of Landeros v. Flood, which case, however,
involved none of the more difficult ethical issues with which
this article is concerned. In Landeros, the patient was the
child victim and, accordingly, the physician's responsibility
was not divided. The case dealt, not with the confidences of
psychotherapy, but with the observable evidence of physical
abuse. The California court decided the key question of profes-
sional standards by holding that "battered child syndrome" was a
legally qualified medical diagnosis which the defendant physician
had negligently failed to make.
The famous Tarasoff case, also decided in California,
is more difficult to reconcile with the principles of confiden-
tiality and the primacy of patient care. Tarasoff was a civil
action by the family of a homicide victim against a therapist to
whom the killer had disclosed his lethal ideations. The case
imposes upon psychotherapists an obligation to protect identifiable
victims of future harm, when a credible threat of violence is
made by a patient in therapy. Usually, the duty takes the form
of warning the intended victim. (As Stone observes, involuntary
commitment, which would incapacitate the potentially violent
patient, was not a favored solution in California.) The Tarasoff
court derived the therapist's obligation to the victim from the
"special relationship" said to exist between therapist and
patient.
The Tarasoff rule, which has been followed elsewhere,
and cited with approval in New York, expands the therapist's
legal duty to include, not only the therapeutic interests of his
patients, but the interests of certain non-patients as well.
These interests may be in conflict. Where, as in Tarasoff, a
threat of deadly violence has been made by a patient capable of
effectuating such threat, the court may understandably place the
safety of the intended victim over the therapeutic needs of the
intended perpetrator. The therapist may also make that choice,
and should be legally free to do so. However, a rule which
requires the therapist to report, upon pain of personal liability,
merely substitutes the coercion of the law for the professional
judgment of the therapist, and introduces extraneous legal
considerations into the therapist's deliberation. While it is
extremely difficult to predict dangerousness, the therapist is,
presumably, in the best position to assess the credibility of
threats made in his presence by his patients.
Moreover, the New York child abuse reporting statute
is not limited to the emergency situation contemplated by
Tarasoff. The New York law makes no express reference to the
nature or degree of the patient's therapeutic needs; the quality
or extent of the abuse or maltreatment which may be suspected;
nor even, most significantly, whether there exists any possibility
that abuse or maltreatment will occur in the future. If the
conditions of the statute are met, the New York therapist has no
discretion to withhold reporting.
Under New York Law, the decision to report is not
vested in the therapist's professional judgment. It is set
forth in a statute which is both civilly and criminally
enforceable against the therapist. As previous arguments have
tried to demonstrate, the statute requires reporting in circum-
stances which may compromise the interests of patients and
children alike. Conscientious psychotherapists are thus torn
between obeying the law to protect their own interests, or
defying the law to promote the interests of their patients. It
is a choice which the law should not require.
[The balance of the New York Law School Law Review article is
devoted to narrowing the dilemma: responses under the present
law; the experience of three other states; and a proposal for
statutory change in New York. The New York statute is discussed
in greater detail, and the questions with which this excerpt
began are analyzed.]
